Semantics count: anonymity and privacy are two different things
Thursday, September 27th, 2007Remember the eBay guy? He sold 90 days’ worth of his non-identifying personal data for $355 back in June, leading me to ask the question:
I can’t help but reflect on deeper questions as I read these stories: mainly, what constitutes an identity?
If I know your habits, your activities, your purchases, your poker games and porn preferences, does it follow that I know you? Surely you are more than just your name—at what point does your identity become non-identifying?
This topic has just resurfaced in a Wired article called Lesson From Tor Hack: Anonymity and Privacy Aren’t the Same. In it, author Bruce Schneier discusses people’s confusion about the difference between anonymous and inaccessible:
As the name implies, Alcoholics Anonymous meetings are anonymous. You don’t have to sign anything, show ID or even reveal your real name. But the meetings are not private. Anyone is free to attend. And anyone is free to recognize you: by your face, by your voice, by the stories you tell. Anonymity is not the same as privacy.
The topic of the article is Tor:
Tor is a free tool that allows people to use the internet anonymously. Basically, by joining Tor you join a network of computers around the world that pass internet traffic randomly amongst each other before sending it out to wherever it is going. Imagine a tight huddle of people passing letters around. Once in a while a letter leaves the huddle, sent off to some destination. If you can’t see what’s going on inside the huddle, you can’t tell who sent what letter based on watching letters leave the huddle.
This system sounds clever; however, if I understood the article correctly (I found it utterly intriguing, but somewhat confusing), Tor has a few problems, and the huddle analogy is a good way to describe them. Although you can’t tell who sent a letter if you can’t see inside the huddle, anyone can join—which means it would be quite easy for someone to gain access to the info you’re trying to hide.
In fact, in a way you’re making it more likely that someone will read the your private data; by definition, you have to pass it around a group before sending it to its destination, as evidenced by this visual description of how the thing works:



Schneier points out, though, that taking an anonymizing route isn’t the same as encrypting. While the information you’re sending is in the Tor huddle, only people in the huddle can see it, but once it leaves, anyone can. It’s like the difference between taking back roads to avoid the cops and wearing a disguise (not that I’ve ever had to do either, thank goodness). From Tor’s FAQs:
Can exit nodes eavesdrop on communications? Isn’t that bad?
Yes, the guy running the exit node can read the bytes that come in and out there. Tor anonymizes the origin of your traffic, and it makes sure to encrypt everything inside the Tor network, but it does not magically encrypt all traffic throughout the Internet.…So I’m totally anonymous if I use Tor?
‘No.’
If your application runs in a virtual machine, it can access local information because it runs locally. Java, Javascript, Macromedia Flash and Shockwave, QuickTime, RealAudio, ActiveX controls, and VBScript are all known to be able to access local information about your operating system and local network. These technologies will work over proxies and can tunnel the information back to their source. They can also open new connections outside of the proxy to communicate data.
Disabling these technologies in your browser can improve the situation.
With an exensible browser like Firefox, make sure you are not using an extension with a similar behavior as described above.
Generally, you should also worry about entering revealing information into a form, or falling victim to spyware, or similar problems.
Also, there are still some technical attacks that probably work against Tor.
Hmmm… comforting.
The other point the article makes reinforces the semantic argument: just because people can’t see that it was you specifically that hit the ‘Send’ button doesn’t mean that they won’t be able to glean confidential information from reading your email, or even identify you by it. Schneier touches on Dark Web, a scary project funded by the National Science Foundation:
One of the tools developed by Dark Web is a technique called Writeprint, which automatically extracts thousands of multilingual, structural, and semantic features to determine who is creating “anonymous” content online. Writeprint can look at a posting on an online bulletin board, for example, and compare it with writings found elsewhere on the Internet. By analyzing these certain features, it can determine with more than 95 percent accuracy if the author has produced other content in the past.
Obviously, as Schneier points out, if your identity is connected to any of that content, you can be found.
I bring these issues up because of my ongoing fascination with clarity, and I put these questions to you in the hopes that together we can explore the concept further:
- What is your biggest privacy concern? Why?
- What would be the downside to having all of your activity exposed for the world to see?
- At what point does exposure become invasive?
If we want to improve online privacy, we need to truly understand where the problems are. Thanks in advance for your comments.









